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Résumé / Abstract 
 
J’analyse le cas où la réalisation d’un engagement contractuel n’est qu’imparfaitement vérifiable. 
La question posée est de savoir si le tribunal doit alors « dire le vrai » quant aux actions faisant 
l’objet d’un litige. Je montre que, du point de vue des contractants, la cour devrait faire 
abstraction d’une partie de l’information disponible et qu’elle devrait parfois statuer en faveur 
d’un des contractants, même si elle considère plus probable que l’autre ait raison. Cette analyse 
fournit une justification à certaines règles de procédure en droit civil et elle justifie le recours à 
des a priori normatifs neutres dans le règlement des différends.  
 
I examine the case where fulfillment of a contractual commitment is only imperfectly verifiable 
and ask whether the court should then “tell the truth” regarding the action in dispute. I show 
that truth seeking does not maximize the expected surplus from contractual relationships. From 
the parties' viewpoint, the enforcer should disregard some of the available information and 
should sometimes rule in favor of one party, even though his understanding is that the other 
party is most probably right. The analysis provides a justification for rules of evidence in 
common law and for the use by courts of neutral normative priors regarding contending claims. 
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A basic purpose of contracts is to formally allow the possibility of resorting to
a third-party, whether a court or arbitrator, to enforce promises and settle
disputes. In the quintessential contractual situation one party, the seller,
agrees to perform some task for the beneﬁt of another party, the buyer.
Depending on how the contract is written, the seller may invest resources
in the expectation of payment by the buyer upon completion of the task
speciﬁed in the contract. Alternatively, the buyer pays up front with the
expectation that the seller will later deliver. Intermediate arrangements are
also possible, where the up-front payment is only a fraction of the total price
or where the seller posts a bond to guarantee completion.
The contract is enforceable if a third-party with authority is able to verify
completion of the action agreed upon. When payment is conditional on
completion, the buyer will pay knowing that he would anyhow be forced to
do so by the court. In turn, this induces the supplier to incur the necessary
costs and deliver the good or service as required by the contract. Similarly,
when payment is up-front, the supplier delivers since he would otherwise be
forced to do so or be required to reimburse the buyer (or compensate him
for foregone beneﬁts, which must be more expensive still). Knowing this,
the buyer has no reluctance to pay up-front. Of course, if the action is non
veriﬁable or if third-party enforceability is too costly, the parties can only
rely, if at all, on informal self-enforcing devices such as reputation or repeated
dealings.
This paper analyzes third-party enforcement when performance is only
imperfectly veriﬁable. For instance, in service contracts with complex quali-
tative features the parties may have a clear idea of the level of service agreed
1upon, but this may be near to impossible to communicate to a third party.
Even if the agreed standard is unambiguous, the third party will also often
be at some informational disadvantage with respect to the parties regard-
ing actual fulﬁllment. Suppose the supplier is a consulting ﬁrm which must
produce a study on some particular issue. Presumably a third-party could
easily detect a really sub-standard report, but in general it would be a mat-
ter of judgement whether the consultant did the appropriate research and
calculations, in accordance with what would normally be expected of him.
Courts are often said to have a truth-detection function. I examine a sim-
ple situation where the only possible dispute between parties is whether or
not a contractual commitment has been fulﬁlled (the possibility of eﬃcient
breach is excluded by assumption). When performance is perfectly veriﬁ-
able, one expects courts to be useful if they are honest and speak truthfully.
The question raised in the paper is whether truth-detection remains desir-
able when veriﬁability is potentially imperfect. Obviously, if information is
imperfect, courts know that they may err. That is, they knows that they will
s o m e t i m e sg i v et h ew r o n gr u l i n ga st ow h e t h e rt h es e l l e rd i do rd i dn o tf u l ﬁll
the contract. By truth-seeking I refer to a situation where courts neverthe-
less attempt to tell the truth as often as possible, subject to the accuracy of
the evidence at their disposal. In disputes regarding fulﬁllment of a promise,
truth-seeking courts decide on the basis of what is most probable given all
the available information. From decision theory, such a strategy is known to
maximize the probability of making correct decisions in the long run.
I show that truth-seeking courts are not in the ex ante interest of the
parties. From their point of view, the perfect court is one whose decision rule
maximizes the ex ante expected surplus from contractual relationships, which
implies providing suppliers with appropriate incentives to fulﬁll the terms of
2the contract. Surplus-maximization requires that, on some occasions, courts
be willing not to tell the truth as they see it. This does not mean they should
be dishonest, but that sometimes they should rule in favor of one party, even
though their understanding is that the other party is most probably right.
The discrepancy between ‘truth-telling’ and the provision of incentives
is well known in principal-agent theory and is related to the time inconsis-
tency of optimal contracts. Thus, in the basic principal-agent model, eﬀort
is implemented through a payment scheme conditioned on some imperfect
performance indicator. Since the principal is fully committed to the scheme,
the agent may then be penalized even though the principal ‘knows’ that the
agent exerted the required level of eﬀort.
In what follows I compare the decision rules of surplus-maximizing versus
truth-seeking courts. The surplus-maximizing decision rule is easily charac-
terized: courts should abstract from some of the information available to
them and approach each case by initially putting equal weights on the par-
ties’ contradictory claims. They should then rule on the basis of what is
most likely given the evidence about the case at hand, irrespective of their
knowledge of how suppliers generally behave in similar cases or of their un-
derstanding of the particular supplier’s incentives to fulﬁll the contract. The
diﬀerence with truth-seeking relates to the courts’ priors about the validity
of the claims. Truth-seeking courts rely on their overall knowledge and un-
derstanding to formulate rational or situation-consistent priors about these
claims. Surplus-maximizing courts use neutral normative priors, which they
know to be incorrect.
The present results draw on Demougin and Fluet (2002). That paper
analyzes the eﬃciency properties, from an incentive point of view, of the
standard of proof for a ruling of negligence in tort cases. We show that the
3‘preponderance of evidence’ standard in common law induces maximum in-
centives to exercise care, provided the standard is interpreted in terms of the
relative likelihood of due care versus negligence.1 Relative likelihood is meant
in the usual mathematical sense, as in non Bayesian decision making. It is
argued that ordinary ‘rules of evidence’ warrant such an interpretation, since
they lead to the exclusion of apparently relevant information. In particular,
according to such rules, judges or jurors are supposed to rid themselves of all
prior beliefs and to begin a trial as if they knew nothing factual. The incon-
sistency between evidentiary rules and Bayesian decision making has been
strongly emphasized recently in Daughety and Reinganum [2000a, 2000b].
I make a similar point in the present paper, although the setting is a
contractual dispute. Surplus-maximizing courts decide on a preponderance
of evidence in terms of relative likelihood, disregarding some of the informa-
tion at their disposal. By contrast, truth-seeking is an instance of standard
Bayesian decision making on the basis of all available information. I extend
the argument by comparing the sequential equilibria resulting from either
type of decision rule. I show that whether a surplus-maximizing rule favors
the buyer (or the seller) more or less often than under truth-seeking depends
on the accuracy of information. I also discuss the value of information under
either rule.2
1Our results hold even if the parties may submit partial or biased evidence and the court
does not know how well informed the parties are. The properties of the preponderance
standard with non discrete action are analyzed in Fluet [1999]. The disincentive eﬀects of
court error are well known in the law in economics literature (e.g. Polinsky and Shavell
[1989] and Kaplow and Shavell [1994]).
2The equilibrium implications, in a tort law setting, of what amounts to truth-telling
are examined in Hylton (1990), but with exogenous type I and type II errors. In a diﬀerent
context but in the spirit of the present analysis, Lewis and Poitevin (1997) analyze the
equilibrium eﬀect of modifying the standard of proof or of changes in accuracy, when the
4The next two sections describe the contractual setting and the courts’
information for verifying performance. The main results are in sections 4
and 5 which compare sequential equilibria under truth-seeking and surplus-
maximization. Section 6 draws implications regarding the value of informa-
tion and the role for ‘evidentiary rules’ aimed at excluding information.
2 The model
A party contracts with another for the undertaking of some task or project.
The buyer’s beneﬁt from a half completed project is vl and the seller’s cost
is cl <v l. If fully completed, the project is worth vl + v and costs cl + c.A t
the contracting date, vl, cl and v are common knowledge and both parties
know that c is distributed according to the c.d.f. G(c) with density g(c) > 0
on the interval [c,c],w h e r ec ≤ v.T h ev a l u eo fc becomes known only to the
seller during the course of the project, once he has half completed the action
and therefore expended cl. At that point the seller decides whether he will
indeed complete the task, in which case he incurs the additional costs c.
When all is done, the court is able to verify whether some action has been
undertaken by the seller, as opposed to no action at all. However, it can only
imperfectly verify whether there has been full completion as opposed to half
completion. One interpretation is that vl refers to a low-quality variant of
the project, while vl + v is the high quality. The court cannot perfectly
distinguish between high and low quality, but would know if nothing has
been done. The sequence of events and actions is depicted in ﬁgure 1.
























If quality were completely unveriﬁable, the parties would contract for
the low quality since this is worthwhile by itself (i.e. cl <v l). If it were
perfectly veriﬁable, they would contract for the high quality since c<vwith
probability one.3 In the latter case, because of symmetric information at the
contracting date, there always exists an arrangement maximizing the parties’
expected surplus ex ante, i.e. inducing the seller to supply high quality. One
such arrangement is the following. The buyer pays the total price p up-front
and the seller simultaneously posts a bond b to be forfeited to the buyer if
high quality is not delivered. These satisfy
cl + ce ≤ p ≤ vl + v. (1)
where ce is the expected value of c and
b ≥ vl + v. (2)
The ﬁrst condition describes the participation constraints for both the
buyer and the seller. The second inequality is an incentive compatibility
condition. Once cl has been expended, the seller is better oﬀ completing
the project because he loses b if he does not, while his opportunity cost of
d o i n gs oi ss o m ec less than v. At the inception of the contract, he is also
3With vl = cl =0 , the results in the next section would be essentially the same, but
with ‘no contract equilibria’ substituting for ‘low-quality contracts’.
6better oﬀ expending cl since otherwise he loses b for sure, while his expected
opportunity cost of delivering is cl + ce <b .B yl e t t i n gp vary between the
lower and upper bounds in (1) and choosing b to satisfy (2), any distribution
of the ex ante gains to trade can be attained. Other arrangements are possi-
ble, but they are essentially equivalent if third-party enforcement is costless.
For instance, the total price p may be interpreted as being paid only upon
completion, with the seller posting an actual performance bond of amount
b − p.
Under imperfect veriﬁability, the court may err in the assessment of qual-
ity. Let α denote the probability that high quality is held not to have been
delivered, when in fact it has. Let β b et h ep r o b a b i l i t yo ft h es a m er u l i n g
when the seller only supplied the low quality. Thus, α and 1−β are the type
I and type II error respectively (where these come from will be described
shortly). At the date of contract, parties take these probabilities as given.
Under the previous contractual arrangement, and denoting by l and h the low
and high quality respectively, a seller supplying the low quality has expected
proﬁt
πl = p − c − βb. (3)
A seller with cost c supplying the high quality earns the proﬁt
πh = p − c − c − αb. (4)
The possibility of court error creates a two-sided opportunism problem. The
seller can get away with a half completed project with probability 1 − β.
Conversely, the buyer has an incentive to claim that the task has not been
performed as agreed, since there is a probability α that the court will be
convinced even though the claim is false.
Once he has observed c,i ti sp r o ﬁtable for the seller to complete the
7project if πh ≥ πl or equivalently
c ≤ (β − α)b ≡ e c. (5)
A contract for delivery of the high quality is therefore fulﬁlled with proba-
bility G(e c). The seller’s expected proﬁti s
e π = p − cl −
] e c
c
cg(c)dc − [G(e c)α +( 1− G(e c))β]b (6)
and the buyer’s expected net beneﬁti s
e v = vl + G(e c)v +[ G(e c)α +( 1− G(e c))β]b − p. (7)
Total expected surplus is
e s = e v + e π = vl − cl +
] e c
c
[v − c]g(c)dc > 0, (8)
the inequality being satisﬁed for any value of e c.
Provided β > α, court error clearly does not matter if money transfers
between parties can be arbitrarily large, i.e. a ﬁrst-best outcome is then
always feasible. To see this, suppose b is large enough for e c>c to hold.
Then the total expected surplus is the perfect information surplus
vl + v − cl − ce
Furthermore, e π ≥ 0 and e v ≥ 0 if the price p paid up-front satisﬁes
cl + ce + αb ≤ p ≤ vl + v + αb (9)
Of course, from (5) and (9) this may require arbitrarily large transfers p and
b if β − α is very small (although positive) and α > 0.
I assume that feasible money transfers between the parties are bounded.
A standard justiﬁcation is that the parties have limited wealth. Thus, p must
8be bounded above by the buyer’s wealth; from the participation constraint
(9), this restricts the b’s that can be agreed upon. Another possible justiﬁca-
tion is that the common law tradition prevents courts from enforcing penalty
clauses in contracts. Penalty clauses refer to terms stipulating damages that
exceed the actual harm caused by non performance. In the present context,
this means that courts would be reluctant to enforce damages of amount b
that are out of proportion with what would be needed to compensate the
buyer.
For simplicity, I focus on the second justiﬁcation and assume that the
seller can at most be made to compensate the buyer for foregone beneﬁts,
given the terms of the contract. Suppose as before that the buyer pays p up-
front. If the seller is found (possibly erroneously) to have delivered only the
low quality, he is forced to pay v to the buyer. Since the latter has already
obtained vl,h i sn e tb e n e ﬁti st h e nvl +v − p as promised in the contract. If
the seller is found to have taken no action at all, which would be detected
with certainty, he is made to pay vl + v to the buyer who therefore again
obtains the same net beneﬁt.4
The foregoing is equivalent to the seller forfeiting with certainty a bond
equal to vl +v if he takes no action at all. Once he has already expended cl,
he risks forfeiting the bond b = v if the court rules that he has not completed
the task. From (5), once c is observed, the seller therefore has an incentive
to complete only if
c ≤ (β − α)v ≡ e c. (10)
The parties can always at least agree to a contract for the low quality.
4This corresponds to ‘expectation damages’ in common law, whereby the promisee is
restored to the beneﬁts he would have obtained if the promise had been kept (see for
instance Cooter and Uhlen [2000])
9Whether the agreement will in fact specify the high quality depends on
whether the latter can be expected to be supplied with positive probabil-
ity.
Rhvxow 1: A contract is always agreed upon, whether for the low or the
high quality. It speciﬁes the high quality if
(β − α)v>c. (11)
3C o u r t d e c i s i o n s
Ex post the parties jointly observe evidence – various facts, written opinions
by experts, etc. – that can be costlessly communicated to the third-party.
Since any piece of information favors one party or the other, all relevant
evidence is always communicated (or rather the result is the same as if it
had been, see Milgrom and Roberts [1986]). The outcome of the parties’
disclosure decisions and of the confrontation of expert opinion is modeled
as if the court observed a signal x correlated with the seller’s action. The
signal is distributed according to the c.d.f. Fi(x) with density fi(x) > 0
on the unit interval [0,1],w h e r ei = h,l denotes the action; furthermore, x
satisﬁes MLRP with the likelihood ratio fl(x)/fh(x) strictly decreasing on
the support, meaning that high quality appears relatively more likely for
large values of the signal.
The assumptions concerning the signal are without loss of generality.
The actual evidence and outcome of the parties’ confrontation before the
third party might be a ‘complex’ random vector (z1,...,z N) with densities
hi(z1,...,z N) for i = h,l. However, whether he is truth-seeking or surplus
10maximizing, the third party’s decision will turn out to depend on the evidence
only through the likelihood ratio hl/hh. A monotonic transformation
x = ϕ[hl(z1,...,z N)/hh(z1,...,z N)]
c a nt h e na l w a y sb ef o u n ds u c ht h a tx is a suﬃcient statistic satisfying MLRP
and with the unit interval as support.5 The underlying assumption is that the
possible evidence on which the court will base its ruling is indeed ‘complex’
and cannot be directly contracted upon by the parties. Nevertheless, that
evidence can help the court form an ‘opinion’ as to what occurred. In eﬀect,
the parties are constrained to contracts specifying transfers contingent on
the court’s opinion regarding the seller’s performance.
4 Surplus-maximization
The court’s decision rule implies some α and β, leading to the cost threshold
e c = v(β − α) for the seller to actually deliver high quality. The decision rule
is surplus-maximizing if the resulting type I and type II error are such as to
maximize
e s = vl − cl +
] e c
c
[v − c]g(c)dc. (12)
As u ﬃcient condition is that e c be made as large as possible (this is necessary
if the largest feasible e c is less than c). It follows that the appropriate decision
rule maximizes the probability β o fp e n a l i z i n gan o n - p e r f o r m i n gs e l l e r ,f o r
some type I error α of penalizing a performing one. The foregoing amounts
to the characterization of an eﬃcient test of hypothesis in classical statistics.
5In a test about a simple hypothesis (h versus l), all realizations of (z1,...,z N) can
be ordered in terms of ‘more favorable than’ in the sense of Milgrom [1981], hence the
existence of a scalar suﬃcient statistic satisfying MLRP.
11From Neyman and Pearson’s lemma, this means that the seller should be
held not to have performed if the likelihood ratio fl(x)/fh(x) is greater than
some critical value.6 Given MLRP, the court must rule that the seller has
not fulﬁlled the contract when observing x<e x, for some critical e x.
The cost threshold e c for the seller to actually deliver high quality therefore
satisﬁes
e c = v(β − α)=v [Fl(e x) − Fh(e x)]. (13)
Since MLRP implies ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance, e c is strictly positive
for any e x ∈ (0,1) and is zero when e x is zero or unity. Furthermore, it is
easily seen that e c is a quasi-concave function of e x. Threfore, maximizing the
foregoing expression leads to the critical e xS satisfying the ﬁrst-order condition
fl(e xS)=fh(e xS). (14)
Denote the resulting cost threshold by e cS. The condition (14) is necessary
if e cS ≤ c, meaning that the seller may then not always supply the high
quality. When e cS > c the court could choose the critical value arbitrarily in
some interval which includes e xS. For simplicity, I assume the latter is always
chosen.
The surplus-maximizing decision rule has a simple interpretation. fh(x)
and fl(x) are the likelihoods of the actions h or l given the evidence x (i.e.
the probability of observing x if h or l has been undertaken). When the
evidence is such that fl(x) >f h(x), which occurs when x<e xS,l o wq u a l i t y
is more likely and the arbitrator rules accordingly. When fh(x) >f l(x),h i g h
quality is more likely and the arbitrator holds that high care has indeed been
delivered.
6Equivalently, in terms of the true ‘complex’ evidence, if hl(z1,...,z N)/hl(z1,...,zN) is
greater than some critical value.
12Figures 2a and 2b about here
The relative likelihood rule is illustrated in the ﬁgures 2a and 2b. Note
that G(e c), the probability of high quality being delivered, is itself a quasi-
concave function of e x. In 2a, not all sellers deliver the high quality as some
ﬁnd that their cost of doing so is greater than their private beneﬁt. Neverthe-
less, the probability that the seller delivers is maximized given the circum-
stances. In ﬁgure 2b, the seller always provides the high quality even though
veriﬁability is imperfect. Compared to the ﬁrst ﬁgure, either the evidence is
more informative, in the sense of greater veriﬁability of the seller’s action, or
c/v is smaller so that smaller incentives are required to induce performance.
The values x1 and x2 in the ﬁgures are the solutions to
v [Fl(x) − Fh(x)] = c. (15)
It may be that this equation has no solution. This occurs when at the critical
value deﬁned by the relative likelihood rule
v [Fl(e xS) − Fh(e xS)] <c. (16)
In this case, veriﬁability is very poor and the parties know that a promise to
deliver the high quality will never be fulﬁlled, which means that they settle
for the low quality contract.
Rhvxow 2: A surplus-maximizing court rules on the basis of the relative
likelihood of performance versus non performance, i.e. it decides against the
seller whenever fl(x) >f h(x) and against the buyer otherwise.
The relative likelihood rule maximizes the probability of performance in
a contract promising high quality, as well as the chances of such a contract
13b e i n ga g r e e du p o ni nt h eﬁrst place. Clearly, if the parties could directly
contract on transfers contingent on the ex post evidence, the critical regions
speciﬁed in the contract would also be determined on the basis of relative
likelihoods. In other words, a surplus-maximizing court is a perfect substitute
for the contractibility of the evidence.
5 Truth-seeking
It is easy to see why truth-seeking courts may not be in the parties’ interest.
Take ﬁgure 2b for instance and assume that, for some reason, the parties
expect the court to assess performance on the basis of the critical value
e xS. A rational court understanding the seller’s incentives would then know
that high quality has been delivered. Thus, it would conform to the parties’
expectations only if it is willing not to ‘tell the truth’ when x<e xS.
Before taking into account the realization x for the case at hand, a court
has some ‘prior’ µ0 regarding the probability that high quality was delivered.
This rests on its overall information and on its knowledge of the decision rule
generally used by courts (and therefore of the incentives provided by court
rulings). Up-dating on the basis of the particular x i nt h ec a s ea th a n d ,t h e





This is a strictly increasing function of x,p r o v i d e dµ0  =0 ,1.W h e nµ1(x) >
1/2, the court’s understanding given all available information is that high
quality is more probable. If it seeks the truth, it would rule in favor of
the seller. Under truth-seeking, the courts’ decision rule therefore implies a
critical value e x which depends on priors (as before the quality is held to be
14low if x<e x).
In equilibrium, the priors are situation consistent and therefore µ0 = G(e c)
where e c depends on e x as in the foregoing section. Let e xT denote an equi-
librium cutoﬀ with truth-seeking courts. Obviously e xT =1is always an
equilibrium: irrespective of x,c o u r t st h e na l w a y sh o l dt h a tl o wq u a l i t yh a s
been delivered, which provides no incentives (i.e. G(e cT)=0 ) and implies that
courts are right in their decision. By contrast, there can be no equilibrium
where high quality is delivered with certainty since courts would rule accord-
ingly, which also provides no incentives. If it exists, an equilibrium with a









where e c = v [Fl(e x) − Fh(e x)].
Figures 3a, 3b and 3c about here
If by coincidence G(e cS)=1 /2 at the surplus-maximizing cutoﬀ,t h e n
e xT = e xS is a solution but this is of course non generic. If high quality is at
all possible under truth-seeking, there are generally multiple equilibria. In
the ﬁgures 3a to 3c, I use the fact that condition (18) can be rewritten as
fl(e x)
fh(e x)
[1 − G(e c)] = G(e c). (19)
For x<e xS, the left-hand side is strictly decreasing in e x while the right-hand
side is increasing. In each ﬁgure, the ‘good’ equilibrium is at the intersection
point A, as opposed to the equilibrium at B (and the really ‘bad’ one at
e xT =1where (19) is not satisﬁed).
15Focusing on the ‘good’ outcome, to what extent does a truth-seeking
equilibrium diﬀer from surplus maximization? In the ﬁgures 3a and 3b,
G(e cT) > 1/2 and e xT < e xS. Compared with a surplus-maximizer, a truth-
seeker then needs more convincing evidence (i.e. a larger likelihood ratio
fl/fh ) to hold that low quality was delivered. This follows directly from the
fact that surplus maximizing is similar to truth-seeking, but with ‘neutral’
priors equal to one half regarding high or low quality. Alternatively, one could
say that situations then sometimes arise where a rational surplus maximizing
court would know that it is ‘unfairly’ penalizing the seller. The opposite
occurs at the good equilibrium A in ﬁgure 3c. In this case G(e cT) < 1/2 and
e xT > e xS. Compared to a surplus-maximizer, a truth-seeking court then needs
more convincing evidence to hold that good quality was provided. In this
case, a rational surplus-maximizer would knowingly at times be ‘unfair’ to
the buyer, ruling that he was supplied high quality but thinking the opposite
is more probably true.
Everything else equal, which case arises depends on the extent to which
the seller’s action is veriﬁable. The more informative the evidence (as de-
termined by the characteristics of fh and fl), the larger the probability of
high quality under surplus maximization. More informative evidence means
a larger β = Fl(e x) for any type I error α = Fh(e x). Geometrically, this induces
an upward shift in the G(e c) curve and therefore an increase in the probability
G(e cS) under surplus maximization. The next result characterizes the ‘good’
equilibria under truth telling using the outcome under surplus-maximization
as benchmark (a formal proof is omitted but the argument follows readily
from the ﬁgures).
Rhvxow 3: Generically G(e cT) <G (e cS). If the evidence is suﬃciently infor-
mative for G(e cS) > 1/2 to obtain, then e xT < e xS and G(e cT) > 1/2.I f i t i s
16relatively uninformative so that G(e cS) < 1/2,t h e ne xT > e xS.
In other words, if the evidence has relatively good informational content,
the probability of erroneously penalizing a seller delivering high quality (the
type I error) is greater under surplus maximization than under truth-seeking.
The opposite occurs if the evidence has weak informational content. In all
cases, except the non generic situation alluded to above, truth-telling induces
a lower probability of performance.7
6 Discussion and concluding remarks
Formal court procedures are characterized by ‘rules of evidence’ which ex-
clude as inadmissible apparently relevant information. According to such
rules, information such as ‘evidence of character’ or purely statistical infor-
mation which could ‘bias’ opinion should not be considered. If such evidence
has inadvertently been communicated, the judge or jury are required to ignore
it in reaching a decision. In the context of the present model, exclusionary
rules can be rationalized as a means of aligning courts tempted to seek the
truth away from truth-seeking and more towards surplus-maximization.
The point that evidentiary rules may be justiﬁed for the purpose of pro-
viding incentives is also made by Daughety and Reinganum (2000): “It is
plausible to interpret such rules as focusing decision making on the evidence
provided at trial and discouraging the substitution of the fact ﬁnder’s subjec-
tive prior for the evidence. To the extent that a decision relies on a (possibly
7An equilibrium with a positive probability of high quality may not exist under truth-
seeking, even though G(e cS) > 0 under surplus maximization. This occurs when the
relevant curves in the ﬁgures do not intersect (i.e. when the left-hand side of (19) is
always greater than the right hand side).
17strong) subjective prior, this reliance reduces the incentives for the parties
to provide evidence ... [and] the defendant’s incentive to take care”. Posner
(1999) presents a similar argument and makes the additional point that rules
of evidence allow ‘non biased’ priors: “Ideally we want the trier of fact to
work from prior odds of 1 to 1 that the plaintiﬀ ... has a meritorious case”.8
Arbitrary subjective priors and biases clearly can do not good, whether
for providing incentives nor for that matter for getting at the truth. However,
in the model presented above the priors of a truth-seeking court are neither
subjective nor biased. They are precisely those an objective outside observer
(a ‘social scientist’) would want to hold, if he had the same general knowledge
and was concerned with accuracy in the case at hand. Indeed, one could say
that it is the surplus maximizing court which holds biased priors, which it
presumably knows to be inconsistent with the situation.
The notion of bias has two diﬀerent meanings here. For the ‘social sci-
entist’, whose role is not to provide incentives but indeed to tell the truth,
the absence of bias is interpreted in terms of rational priors, consistent with
Bayesian decision making on the basis of all available information. By con-
trast, in Posner’s statement, the absence of bias has the normative meaning
of giving ‘equal chances’ to each parties’ contention. The preceding analysis
showed that such normative ‘neutral’ priors have useful eﬃciency proper-
ties from an incentive point of view – i.e. when the issue in dispute is the
discretionary action of one of the parties.
Within the present framework, if the parties could choose the enforcer’s
decision rule, they would require the court to hold equal priors regarding the
actions h or l and to up-date on the basis of x.T h u s x (together with its
8Prior odds diﬀering from 1 to 1 are also described as ‘biased’ in Froeb and Kobayashi
(1996) for instance.
18densities fh and fl) would constitute the admissible evidence, as opposed to
information of a general character such as the distribution G(c).O fc o u r s e ,
in the model the distinction between priors and up-dating is trivial since all
cases submitted to the court are drawn from the same population and x is
the only piece of information speciﬁcally related to a particular dispute. But
consider the following extension of the model. Suppose the seller’s diﬀerential
cost c for the high quality can also become known to the court.9 The evidence
t a k e ni n t oa c c o u n tc o u l dt h e nb ee i t h e re = x as before or e =( x,c).B o t hx
and c are speciﬁc to the particular dispute. But would taking c into account
be useful?
In the present context, the informational value of c is nil from the point
of view of surplus maximization. That is, the possibility for courts of con-
ditioning their ruling on both c and x cannot increase the parties’ ex ante
surplus, compared to conditioning on x alone. Irrespective of c, surplus max-
imization is obtained if courts rule that quality is low when x<e xS and high
when x>e xS,w h e r ee xS is deﬁned as before by fl(e xS)=fh(e xS).T h u s , i f
the parties can choose the court’s decision rule, they may as well require c
to be disregarded or rejected as inadmissible evidence. In fact, one suspects
that declaring c inadmissible may be useful in that it may make it easier for
courts to hold ‘neutral’ priors concerning the seller’s action.
Suppose by contrast that the parties must deal with truth-seeking courts.
If c is admissible, the court would up-date its overall prior on the basis of
e =( x,c). This can be decomposed in two steps. First, observing c,i tu p -
dates to θ(c) deﬁned as the equilibrium probability that a seller with costs c
9For simplicity, I nevertheless assume that c is non contractible. Relaxing this assump-
tion would not aﬀect the argument.





As in the preceding section a truth-seeking court rules that high quality has
been supplied if µ1(x,c) > 1/2. The diﬀerence is that the critical values for
x now depend on c and are of the form e xT(c).
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which high quality is supplied with
positive probability is now characterized as follows. First, a seller with cost
c>e cS never supplies high quality, in other words θ(c)=0in that case. A
seller with c ≤ e cS randomizes with probability θ(c) between high and low,
where θ(c) and e xT(c) satisfy:
[Fl(e xT(c)) − Fl(e xT(c))]v = c, (21)
fl(e xT(c))
fh(e xT(c))
[1 − θ(c)] = θ(c). (22)
The ﬁrst condition states that the seller is indiﬀerent between high and
low quality and therefore may randomize. The second condition follows from
µ1(e xT(c),c)=1 /2, meaning that the court would rule that high quality has
been supplied if x>e xT(c) for a seller with cost characteristics c.F r o mt h e
foregoing equations, it is easily veriﬁed that e xT(c) and θ(c) are respectively
increasing and decreasing. Hence courts need a more convincing x to rule
against a low c seller.
Whether it is in the ex ante interest of the parties to allow truth-seeking
courts to observe c is ambiguous. It is easy to produce situations where the
parties are worse oﬀ and this may in fact be the more prevalent case. The
reason is that sellers who would have supplied high quality when only x is
admissible will now randomize between high and low. The oﬀ-setting eﬀect
is that some sellers will also randomize who would not have delivered high
20quality when only x is admissible. The number of such sellers will tend to
be small if the cut-oﬀ e cT under x alone does not diﬀer too much from the
surplus-maximizing e cS.
The present results have been derived in a somewhat restrictive frame-
work. In particular, the submission of evidence was costless and parties were
assumed to have access to the same body of evidence, which reduces the
scope for manipulating the evidence presented to the third-party. Never-
theless, the general thrust of the argument should hold in a more complex
environment. That is, in disputes concerning the fulﬁllment of contractual
commitments and where performance is imperfectly veriﬁable, it is generally
not in the ex ante interest of the parties that truth-seeking be the criterion
for court rulings. Furthermore, it should generally be in the interest of the
parties that some information be disregarded, as in the standard ‘rules of
evidence’ in common law.
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